Here's an odd one on trademarks.
The article was published in pharmabiz on Thursday, December 30, 2004.
Normally, any symbol or word capable of graphical representation and distinct enough to distinguish the goods and services of one person from those of others may be registered as a trade mark. Upon registration, the owner acquires an exclusive right, in perpetuity, to use the trademark.It is common practice to name drugs either by the name of the organ it treats (Liver: LIV-52), or by the principal ingredients (Cipro-floxacin: CIPRO), or the name of the ailment (Common cold: COLDARIN), which enables the doctor to associate a particular trade name with the organ, ingredient or ailment thereby reducing the chance of error.
Predominan-tly, trade names are derived from the chemical name or the generic name. The chemical names and generic names cannot per se be registered as trade mark as they are hit by section 13 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The section states that no word which is the commonly used and accepted name of any single chemical element or single chemical compound in respect of a chemical substance shall be registered as a trade mark.
Moreover, chemical names would be rendered unregistrable as a trade mark under clause (a) of section 9 which states that trade marks devoid of any distinctive character, capable of distinguishing goods of one person from those of another, shall not be registered. As chemical names designate the kind of goods, the goods will be rendered unregistrable even under clause (b) of section 9 which provides that trade marks which consist exclusively of marks which may serve in trade to designate the kind of goods shall not be registered.Under section 23(1) of the old Act (Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958) the Central Government is empowered to give directions as to the list of marks that are not registrable. Accordingly, it has issued a direction that no trade mark shall be registered in respect of the following drugs:
1. Analgin
2. Aspirin
3. Chloropromazine
4. Ferrous Sulphate
5. Piperazine and its salt such as adipate, citrate and phosphate
6. New single ingredient drug first introduced in India
While making a trade mark application for pharmaceuticals pertaining to the above list, the Registrar of Trade Marks requires the filing of an affidavit stating that the trade mark applied for is not used or intended to be used in respect of the listed drugs. However, the new Act (Trade Marks Act, 1999) does not contain a similar provision.The pharmaceutical industry has devised ways to get over these provisions which restrict the use of chemical names. Ingeniously, drug manufacturers resort to coining words which contain a part of the chemical name, so that the product may be identified with a particular chemical substance. For instance, the drug containing the Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) Ciprofloxacin is manufactured by different companies under the trade names ALCIPRO, CIPRO, CIPROBID, CIPROLET, CIPROVA. The word CIPRO figures in the trade names of all the above products. This serves the purpose of identifying the drug. But the same has also given rise to trade mark infringement cases filed by drug companies on the ground that product of its competitor which employs a part of the chemical name in its trade name, is deceptively similar to its own trade name.
In USV Ltd. v. Systopic Laboratories Ltd., 2004 (1) CTC 418, the Madras High Court had to decide whether the two pharmaceutical trade names "PIO" and "PIOZ" containing the API, Pioglitazone were deceptively similar. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court upheld the decision of the Single Judge in USV Ltd. v. Systopic Laboratories Ltd., 2003 (27) PTC 203 (Mad). In holding that the two names were not deceptively similar, the Court stated that the word "PIO" has become publici juris and that there could be no monopoly over it. The rules regarding deceptive similarity take a special connotation with regard to pharmaceutical trade names. As the drugs are prescribed by registered medical practitioners and dispensed by qualified pharmacists, the chances of confusion arising out of two products being deceptively similar are considerably reduced. To this extent, some similarity is allowed.
The concept of publici juris deals with public rights. The term signifies a thing or a right that is open and exercisable by all persons. It designates things that belong to the entire community, and not to any private party. The Madras High Court held that the term PIO being a part of the chemical name, PIOGLITAZONE, belongs to the public domain and as such no one can have a right over it.Usually, common suffixes or prefixes do not come in the way of distinctiveness. The nature of certain trades may require common suffix/ prefix for the purpose of familiarity. The distinctive nature of the word would then depend on the remaining part of the word attached to these common suffixes and prefixes. A term would be considered as a prefix or suffix only if they are derived from common or generic words.
But if the name is derived or coined form the name signifying the principal ingredient used in the medicine, no distinctiveness or exclusiveness can be claimed by the manufacturer in respect of that part of the name. It is now well-settled that no person can claim exclusive use of the descriptive and generic terms and it would be highly undesirable to confer on one trader proprietary right over the use of an ordinary, descriptive or generic word indicative of the nature, composition and quality of the goods as that would give him complete monopoly to exhibit the word to the exclusion of others(Panacea Biotec v. Recon, 1996).Pharmaceutical companies should cautiously exercise the choice of naming their products with trade names derived from the chemical or generic name. Though it grants familiarity to the new drug, it also dilutes the proprietary right over the trade name. There can be no monopoly over a chemical name which is descriptive of a particular ingredient.
Thursday, September 15, 2005
Wednesday, August 31, 2005
Intellectual property rights — US, trade sanctions and IPRs
This article was published in The Hindu Business Line on Tuesday, Jun 15, 2004.
DESPITE India's recent endeavour to comply fully with its TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) obligations, the US has put India on the "priority watch list" under Section 301 for failing to provide adequate level of protection for Intellectual Property Rights.
Section 301 and USTR
Section 301 of the US Trade Act, 1974 permits the US to unilaterally treat trade related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) as a part of its trade law. Section 301, through an amendment in 1984, empowered the US President to take action for inadequate protection of IPRs of US citizens in foreign countries.
An investigation under Section 301 may be commenced either by a petition filed by an interested party before the United States Trade Representative (USTR) requesting an investigation of a particular practice of a foreign country or by suo motu action of the USTR. Upon the conclusion of investigation, the US may take retaliatory action against the recalcitrant country.
Action under Section 301 will include suspension or withdrawal of trade concessions, imposition of trade duties and other restrictions and suspension or withdrawal of benefits under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). GSP offers preferential treatment for developing countries.
Under Section 301, the denial of adequate and effective protection of the IPRs, even if the foreign country is in compliance with TRIPS, can be a cause for retaliatory action. Thus, the threshold of intellectual property protection mandated under Section 301 is much higher than the protection standards under TRIPS.
Section 301 also provides that where an investigation involves an alleged violation of trade agreement, like the WTO Agreement, the USTR must follow the dispute settlement provisions set out in that agreement. Thus, the power to initiate unilateral action against India for non-compliance with the TRIPS, which forms a part of the WTO Agreements, is inhibited, as the USTR must take recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO.
"Special 301" Annual Report
The Annual Report of the USTR identifies countries that are "priority foreign country", where investigations on IPRs infringement were to be launched and action completed within the specified time limit. Though not required by law, the USTR also identifies and puts countries on the "priority watch list" (countries with whom bilateral negotiations are initiated) or the "watch list" (countries whose IPR developments are monitored).
The Special 301 Annual Report issued on May 3 identifies India as a `priority watch list' country and threatens it with trade sanctions, which may be imposed either unilaterally through Section 310 or multilaterally through the WTO system. In spite of complying with its TRIPS obligations, India continue to be monitored under Section 301. This is due to the fact that Section 301 demands a greater protection for IPRs than envisaged in the TRIPS.
Unilateralism vs multilateralism
The conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement was seen as a major gain for the developing countries insofar as they traded a unilateral measure — the Section 301 of the US trade law — for a multilateral agreement. But the US trade policy on the IPRs has cast doubt and makes the TRIPS negotiations seem a pyrrhic victory.
First, Section 301 remains a part of the US trade law and is actively used even after TRIPS came into force, despite the specific prohibition on unilateral measures contained in Article 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
Second, what the TRIPS achieved was to arm all WTO member-countries with trade retaliation measures in the form of sanctions, a power which was earlier vested only with the US. This came to be known as the "internationalisation of Section 301".
Third, TRIPS multilateralised the gains from trade sanctions to all the WTO members through the most-favoured-nation (equal treatment) clause in Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement.
It is not now open for one country to enter into a bilateral arrangement so as to limit the damage to only one trading partner.
Combating sanctions
The TRIPS Agreement can act to check the use of Section 301 actions on matters covered by the WTO Agreements as WTO members can challenge retaliation actions of the US under the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism.
Moreover, the US is more likely to use the multilateral dispute settlement procedures under the WTO in settling trade issues on IPRs than resort to unilateral measures contained in Section 301 as it happened in 1997 in US vs. India ("mail-box case").
Even if the US sanctions are not challenged before the WTO, these trade sanctions are likely to have very little effect due to the country graduations from the GSP (once a country graduates from the GSP, it will not be affected by withdrawal of benefits under the GSP), product restrictions and the rapidly diminishing tariff margins between the countries.
The chief objective of the WTO is to progressively open national markets for international trade. This is done by the gradual reduction of tariff and the removal on non-tariff barriers such as product restrictions.
The effect of Section 301 actions by the US will be greatly subdued if developing countries opt to voluntarily forgo the GSP benefits granted to them.
DESPITE India's recent endeavour to comply fully with its TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) obligations, the US has put India on the "priority watch list" under Section 301 for failing to provide adequate level of protection for Intellectual Property Rights.
Section 301 and USTR
Section 301 of the US Trade Act, 1974 permits the US to unilaterally treat trade related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) as a part of its trade law. Section 301, through an amendment in 1984, empowered the US President to take action for inadequate protection of IPRs of US citizens in foreign countries.
An investigation under Section 301 may be commenced either by a petition filed by an interested party before the United States Trade Representative (USTR) requesting an investigation of a particular practice of a foreign country or by suo motu action of the USTR. Upon the conclusion of investigation, the US may take retaliatory action against the recalcitrant country.
Action under Section 301 will include suspension or withdrawal of trade concessions, imposition of trade duties and other restrictions and suspension or withdrawal of benefits under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). GSP offers preferential treatment for developing countries.
Under Section 301, the denial of adequate and effective protection of the IPRs, even if the foreign country is in compliance with TRIPS, can be a cause for retaliatory action. Thus, the threshold of intellectual property protection mandated under Section 301 is much higher than the protection standards under TRIPS.
Section 301 also provides that where an investigation involves an alleged violation of trade agreement, like the WTO Agreement, the USTR must follow the dispute settlement provisions set out in that agreement. Thus, the power to initiate unilateral action against India for non-compliance with the TRIPS, which forms a part of the WTO Agreements, is inhibited, as the USTR must take recourse to the dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO.
"Special 301" Annual Report
The Annual Report of the USTR identifies countries that are "priority foreign country", where investigations on IPRs infringement were to be launched and action completed within the specified time limit. Though not required by law, the USTR also identifies and puts countries on the "priority watch list" (countries with whom bilateral negotiations are initiated) or the "watch list" (countries whose IPR developments are monitored).
The Special 301 Annual Report issued on May 3 identifies India as a `priority watch list' country and threatens it with trade sanctions, which may be imposed either unilaterally through Section 310 or multilaterally through the WTO system. In spite of complying with its TRIPS obligations, India continue to be monitored under Section 301. This is due to the fact that Section 301 demands a greater protection for IPRs than envisaged in the TRIPS.
Unilateralism vs multilateralism
The conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement was seen as a major gain for the developing countries insofar as they traded a unilateral measure — the Section 301 of the US trade law — for a multilateral agreement. But the US trade policy on the IPRs has cast doubt and makes the TRIPS negotiations seem a pyrrhic victory.
First, Section 301 remains a part of the US trade law and is actively used even after TRIPS came into force, despite the specific prohibition on unilateral measures contained in Article 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
Second, what the TRIPS achieved was to arm all WTO member-countries with trade retaliation measures in the form of sanctions, a power which was earlier vested only with the US. This came to be known as the "internationalisation of Section 301".
Third, TRIPS multilateralised the gains from trade sanctions to all the WTO members through the most-favoured-nation (equal treatment) clause in Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement.
It is not now open for one country to enter into a bilateral arrangement so as to limit the damage to only one trading partner.
Combating sanctions
The TRIPS Agreement can act to check the use of Section 301 actions on matters covered by the WTO Agreements as WTO members can challenge retaliation actions of the US under the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism.
Moreover, the US is more likely to use the multilateral dispute settlement procedures under the WTO in settling trade issues on IPRs than resort to unilateral measures contained in Section 301 as it happened in 1997 in US vs. India ("mail-box case").
Even if the US sanctions are not challenged before the WTO, these trade sanctions are likely to have very little effect due to the country graduations from the GSP (once a country graduates from the GSP, it will not be affected by withdrawal of benefits under the GSP), product restrictions and the rapidly diminishing tariff margins between the countries.
The chief objective of the WTO is to progressively open national markets for international trade. This is done by the gradual reduction of tariff and the removal on non-tariff barriers such as product restrictions.
The effect of Section 301 actions by the US will be greatly subdued if developing countries opt to voluntarily forgo the GSP benefits granted to them.
Thursday, July 28, 2005
Patents (Amendment) Bill, 2003: The inevitable regime change
This article had appeared in The Hindu Business Line on Friday, Apr 16, 2004.
The Patents (Amendment) Bill, introduced in the Rajya Sabha on December 22, 2003, shall have the prime objective of fully conforming the Patents Act, 1970 (Act) to the TRIPS obligations under the WTO. The Bill, seen as the final step in the transition period of 10 years granted to developing countries under Article 65 of the TRIP, brings forth the much anticipated regime change for the pharma industry. By January 1, 2005, product patents shall be awarded for food, medicine or drug substances in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement for 20 years.
THE Patents (Amendment) Bill, 2003 was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on December 22, 2003. The Bill, when it comes into force, shall have the prime objective of fully conforming the Patents Act, 1970 (Act) to the TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual Property System) obligations under the World Trade Organisation.
The Bill is seen as the final step in the transition period of 10 years granted to developing countries under Article 65 of the TRIPS; this period ends on December 31, 2004.
The Bill brings forth the much anticipated regime change for the pharmaceutical industry. By January 1, 2005, product patents shall be awarded for food, medicine or drug substances in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement for a period of 20 years. Earlier, the term of process patent for a drug or medicinal substance was five years from the date of sealing of the patent, or seven years from the date of the patent, whichever was shorter.
End of reverse engineering
As of now, Section 5 of the Act, offers only a process patent for food, medicine or drug substances. The Act had specifically excluded product patents for these substances. This concession gave the Indian pharmaceutical companies a right to manufacture drugs patented elsewhere by employing a non-infringing process. The phenomenal growth of the Indian pharmaceutical industry into a Rs 19,700-crore industry is directly linked to the patent concessions it enjoyed. The good days may be coming to an end. The Bill omits Section 5. Thus, Indian companies will no longer to allowed to manufacture patented drugs by reverse engineering.
Some believe that the Bill shall only have a minimal impact on the industry as less than 5 per cent of the drugs available in the Indian market are copies of patented products. Added to this, it is possible for Indian companies to export drugs to Less Developed Countries (LCDs), which shall come into this regime only by 2016.
The Bill introduces Section 92 A, which deals with compulsory licence for export of patented pharmaceutical products in certain exceptional circumstances. It is evident that this provision has been included to facilitate export of drugs to LCDs and elsewhere foreseeing situations such as the one faced by a drug company's HIV/AIDS drug in South Africa.
Unique provisions
As the patents law in India developed differently keeping in view the needs of the local consumers and producers, the Act in itself contained unique provisions not commonly found in the patent legislation of other countries.
One such provision is Section 3 of the Act which provides for the inventions that are not patentable. This Section enumerates 15 such non-patentable inventions which can be used as a ground in opposing a patent before its grant or in revocations proceedings after the grant. Another provision is Section 64 which gives 17 grounds on which a patent may be revoked after its grant. Interestingly, the Bill has not made any substantial change to the above two provisions.
EMRs to go
Understandably, the Bill omits Chapter IV A of the Act which deals with the transitions arrangement of granting Exclusive Marketing Rights (EMR) till the pending patent applications are processed.
The Bill provides for a transitional provision which states that every EMR shall continue to be effective with the same terms and conditions on which it was granted. Section 24 D of the Act provides that the government may, in public interest, sell or distribute the article for which EMR has been granted. The government may also, in public interest, direct that the article shall be sold at a regulated price. These two protections do not figure in the Bill.
The Bill retains the provision dealing with suits relating to infringement of EMRs now contained in Section 24E of Chapter IV A. As suits relating to infringement of EMRs would be treated as suits relating to infringement of patents under Chapter XVIII of the Act, the above grounds contained in Section 64 read with Section 3 could be raised as a counter-claim in a suit.
If the number of infringement suits filed in the recent past is any indication, it is very likely that the Indian courts shall witness a spate of patent related litigation post 2005.
The road ahead
Indian pharmaceutical companies have already devised innovative methods to meet the challenges of the new patent regime. They can continue to supply bulk drugs and active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) with the approval of the patent holder. The option of producing off-patent APIs is also open.
Another option would be to streamline the process of manufacture and to become the cheapest manufacturers of off-patent drugs. Given the distinction in reverse engineering that Indian companies have earned over the years, this prospect holds much promise.
The third option lies in licensing globally successful drugs in India. This shall, however, be subject to Chapter XVI of the Act which deals with Compulsory Licences and the desire of multinationals to team-up with Indian companies. Yet another option would be to position Indian companies as research and development centres for multinationals.
The Patents (Amendment) Bill, introduced in the Rajya Sabha on December 22, 2003, shall have the prime objective of fully conforming the Patents Act, 1970 (Act) to the TRIPS obligations under the WTO. The Bill, seen as the final step in the transition period of 10 years granted to developing countries under Article 65 of the TRIP, brings forth the much anticipated regime change for the pharma industry. By January 1, 2005, product patents shall be awarded for food, medicine or drug substances in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement for 20 years.
THE Patents (Amendment) Bill, 2003 was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on December 22, 2003. The Bill, when it comes into force, shall have the prime objective of fully conforming the Patents Act, 1970 (Act) to the TRIPS (Trade-Related Intellectual Property System) obligations under the World Trade Organisation.
The Bill is seen as the final step in the transition period of 10 years granted to developing countries under Article 65 of the TRIPS; this period ends on December 31, 2004.
The Bill brings forth the much anticipated regime change for the pharmaceutical industry. By January 1, 2005, product patents shall be awarded for food, medicine or drug substances in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement for a period of 20 years. Earlier, the term of process patent for a drug or medicinal substance was five years from the date of sealing of the patent, or seven years from the date of the patent, whichever was shorter.
End of reverse engineering
As of now, Section 5 of the Act, offers only a process patent for food, medicine or drug substances. The Act had specifically excluded product patents for these substances. This concession gave the Indian pharmaceutical companies a right to manufacture drugs patented elsewhere by employing a non-infringing process. The phenomenal growth of the Indian pharmaceutical industry into a Rs 19,700-crore industry is directly linked to the patent concessions it enjoyed. The good days may be coming to an end. The Bill omits Section 5. Thus, Indian companies will no longer to allowed to manufacture patented drugs by reverse engineering.
Some believe that the Bill shall only have a minimal impact on the industry as less than 5 per cent of the drugs available in the Indian market are copies of patented products. Added to this, it is possible for Indian companies to export drugs to Less Developed Countries (LCDs), which shall come into this regime only by 2016.
The Bill introduces Section 92 A, which deals with compulsory licence for export of patented pharmaceutical products in certain exceptional circumstances. It is evident that this provision has been included to facilitate export of drugs to LCDs and elsewhere foreseeing situations such as the one faced by a drug company's HIV/AIDS drug in South Africa.
Unique provisions
As the patents law in India developed differently keeping in view the needs of the local consumers and producers, the Act in itself contained unique provisions not commonly found in the patent legislation of other countries.
One such provision is Section 3 of the Act which provides for the inventions that are not patentable. This Section enumerates 15 such non-patentable inventions which can be used as a ground in opposing a patent before its grant or in revocations proceedings after the grant. Another provision is Section 64 which gives 17 grounds on which a patent may be revoked after its grant. Interestingly, the Bill has not made any substantial change to the above two provisions.
EMRs to go
Understandably, the Bill omits Chapter IV A of the Act which deals with the transitions arrangement of granting Exclusive Marketing Rights (EMR) till the pending patent applications are processed.
The Bill provides for a transitional provision which states that every EMR shall continue to be effective with the same terms and conditions on which it was granted. Section 24 D of the Act provides that the government may, in public interest, sell or distribute the article for which EMR has been granted. The government may also, in public interest, direct that the article shall be sold at a regulated price. These two protections do not figure in the Bill.
The Bill retains the provision dealing with suits relating to infringement of EMRs now contained in Section 24E of Chapter IV A. As suits relating to infringement of EMRs would be treated as suits relating to infringement of patents under Chapter XVIII of the Act, the above grounds contained in Section 64 read with Section 3 could be raised as a counter-claim in a suit.
If the number of infringement suits filed in the recent past is any indication, it is very likely that the Indian courts shall witness a spate of patent related litigation post 2005.
The road ahead
Indian pharmaceutical companies have already devised innovative methods to meet the challenges of the new patent regime. They can continue to supply bulk drugs and active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) with the approval of the patent holder. The option of producing off-patent APIs is also open.
Another option would be to streamline the process of manufacture and to become the cheapest manufacturers of off-patent drugs. Given the distinction in reverse engineering that Indian companies have earned over the years, this prospect holds much promise.
The third option lies in licensing globally successful drugs in India. This shall, however, be subject to Chapter XVI of the Act which deals with Compulsory Licences and the desire of multinationals to team-up with Indian companies. Yet another option would be to position Indian companies as research and development centres for multinationals.
Tuesday, June 21, 2005
Exclusive Marketing Rights — A monopoly without a right?
This article was published in The Hindu Business Line on Saturday, Mar 20, 2004.
THE grant of Exclusive Marketing Right (EMR) to Novartis ("Exclusive Marketing Rights — Novartis gets stay against 6 firms", Business Line, January 24) and the delay in granting EMR to Eli Lilly ("Eli Lilly's ED drug likely to face clone's onslaught", Business Line, February 15, 2004) have raised several controversial issues.
For Novartis, the grant means that it can exclusively sell or distribute its patented anti-cancer drug Glivec containing the active ingredient Imatinib mesylate, which is the subject matter of EMR. This move has affected six Indian pharmaceutical companies which have been manufacturing Imatinib mesylate at one-tenth its price, under different trade names. For Eli Lilly, the delay would result in the loss of profits over its patented drug, Cialis.
The impact of WTO
The Dunkel Draft — the predecessor to the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement — proposed that all countries that did not offer product patents for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products as on January 1, 1995 have to provide a means for accepting applications for such inventions (called the `mailbox'), apply applicable priority rights and provide exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) for such products.
The developing countries had a choice between EMR and product patents and many opted for the latter. As one of the chief opponents of TRIPS, India opted for the interim arrangements of `mailbox' and EMR.
Under Article 65.4 of the TRIPS, developing countries that did not have product patents were to get 10 years to comply with patent provisions in the pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical sectors. But in view of Articles 70.8 and 70.9, these countries did not get even one day's transition, as they had to accept product patent applications through the `mailbox' and EMR.
The concept of EMR has its origin in a US legislation — the Hatch-Waxman Act, 1984, which granted a five-year market exclusivity period for an innovative drug. This provision was meant to protect drugs that either enjoyed no patent protection or had less than five years of protection left at the time of approval.
Not surprisingly, the issue of EMR was brought up by the US before the panel of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body. The issue in United States vs. India (1997) was whether the Indian Patents Act, 1970 (Act) had established a mechanism that adequately preserved novelty and priority with respect to patent applications covering pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical inventions, given that under the Act substances classified as "food, medicine or drug" were entitled to process patent and not product patent protection.
The WTO panel concluded that India did not comply with its obligations under Article 70.8(a) of the TRIPS Agreement and violated its obligation to provide EMR during the transitional period under Article 70.9. The WTO Appellate Body upheld the panel's conclusions.
Consequently, the Act was amended in 1999 granting product patents for pharmaceuticals from January 1, 2005. As a prelude to full implementation in 2005, the Act provided that applicants may immediately receive EMR, a patent-like right governed by conventional patent doctrines.
EMRs: Legal implications
EMRs were introduced as an effective way to stall imitation of patented products by the local industry. It is only a privilege granted in anticipation of a patent right. EMRs offer rights similar to that of patents.
The right to make or use an invention may not be commercially viable without the right to sell or distribute the product. EMRs are even stronger than patents as the right of a national patent office to grant or reject the right is severely circumscribed.
Chapter IV-A of the Act lays down certain preconditions that have to be met before EMRs are granted. Before a claim is made, an application for the same invention should have been filed in a WTO member-country on or after January 1, 1995.
The patent grant and approval to sell and distribute the invention should have been granted in that country on or after the date of making a claim in India. Moreover, the approval to sell or distribute the invention should have been granted by the authority specified in this behalf.
If these conditions are satisfied, the EMR shall be granted from the date of approval till a period of five years or till the date of grant of patent or the date of rejection of application for the grant of patents, whichever is earlier. The grant of EMR would mean that the patent-like protection would be extended to the product even before the patent application is processed.
Disastrous consequences
This interim arrangement can have disastrous consequences. In the event of the patent application failing to materialise in the form of a grant, it would mean that the EMR holder, in most cases pharma MNCs, , obtain a monopoly in selling and distributing products during the period of grant of EMR.
More sinisterly, it could mean exclusive exploitation of new markets without the backing of a right to do so. It is submitted that the Government should demand some security against such exploitation before granting EMR.
The grant of EMR results in a right stronger than that of a patent grant. Compared to a patent, the procedure involved in getting an EMR is much easier and without any provision for opposition of such a grant. India's belief that EMR obligation is weaker than that of product patents is misplaced. As the procedure for granting EMR does not have any review mechanism to check abuse, it can, in effect, offer a monopoly more rigid than that of patents.
THE grant of Exclusive Marketing Right (EMR) to Novartis ("Exclusive Marketing Rights — Novartis gets stay against 6 firms", Business Line, January 24) and the delay in granting EMR to Eli Lilly ("Eli Lilly's ED drug likely to face clone's onslaught", Business Line, February 15, 2004) have raised several controversial issues.
For Novartis, the grant means that it can exclusively sell or distribute its patented anti-cancer drug Glivec containing the active ingredient Imatinib mesylate, which is the subject matter of EMR. This move has affected six Indian pharmaceutical companies which have been manufacturing Imatinib mesylate at one-tenth its price, under different trade names. For Eli Lilly, the delay would result in the loss of profits over its patented drug, Cialis.
The impact of WTO
The Dunkel Draft — the predecessor to the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement — proposed that all countries that did not offer product patents for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products as on January 1, 1995 have to provide a means for accepting applications for such inventions (called the `mailbox'), apply applicable priority rights and provide exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) for such products.
The developing countries had a choice between EMR and product patents and many opted for the latter. As one of the chief opponents of TRIPS, India opted for the interim arrangements of `mailbox' and EMR.
Under Article 65.4 of the TRIPS, developing countries that did not have product patents were to get 10 years to comply with patent provisions in the pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical sectors. But in view of Articles 70.8 and 70.9, these countries did not get even one day's transition, as they had to accept product patent applications through the `mailbox' and EMR.
The concept of EMR has its origin in a US legislation — the Hatch-Waxman Act, 1984, which granted a five-year market exclusivity period for an innovative drug. This provision was meant to protect drugs that either enjoyed no patent protection or had less than five years of protection left at the time of approval.
Not surprisingly, the issue of EMR was brought up by the US before the panel of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body. The issue in United States vs. India (1997) was whether the Indian Patents Act, 1970 (Act) had established a mechanism that adequately preserved novelty and priority with respect to patent applications covering pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical inventions, given that under the Act substances classified as "food, medicine or drug" were entitled to process patent and not product patent protection.
The WTO panel concluded that India did not comply with its obligations under Article 70.8(a) of the TRIPS Agreement and violated its obligation to provide EMR during the transitional period under Article 70.9. The WTO Appellate Body upheld the panel's conclusions.
Consequently, the Act was amended in 1999 granting product patents for pharmaceuticals from January 1, 2005. As a prelude to full implementation in 2005, the Act provided that applicants may immediately receive EMR, a patent-like right governed by conventional patent doctrines.
EMRs: Legal implications
EMRs were introduced as an effective way to stall imitation of patented products by the local industry. It is only a privilege granted in anticipation of a patent right. EMRs offer rights similar to that of patents.
The right to make or use an invention may not be commercially viable without the right to sell or distribute the product. EMRs are even stronger than patents as the right of a national patent office to grant or reject the right is severely circumscribed.
Chapter IV-A of the Act lays down certain preconditions that have to be met before EMRs are granted. Before a claim is made, an application for the same invention should have been filed in a WTO member-country on or after January 1, 1995.
The patent grant and approval to sell and distribute the invention should have been granted in that country on or after the date of making a claim in India. Moreover, the approval to sell or distribute the invention should have been granted by the authority specified in this behalf.
If these conditions are satisfied, the EMR shall be granted from the date of approval till a period of five years or till the date of grant of patent or the date of rejection of application for the grant of patents, whichever is earlier. The grant of EMR would mean that the patent-like protection would be extended to the product even before the patent application is processed.
Disastrous consequences
This interim arrangement can have disastrous consequences. In the event of the patent application failing to materialise in the form of a grant, it would mean that the EMR holder, in most cases pharma MNCs, , obtain a monopoly in selling and distributing products during the period of grant of EMR.
More sinisterly, it could mean exclusive exploitation of new markets without the backing of a right to do so. It is submitted that the Government should demand some security against such exploitation before granting EMR.
The grant of EMR results in a right stronger than that of a patent grant. Compared to a patent, the procedure involved in getting an EMR is much easier and without any provision for opposition of such a grant. India's belief that EMR obligation is weaker than that of product patents is misplaced. As the procedure for granting EMR does not have any review mechanism to check abuse, it can, in effect, offer a monopoly more rigid than that of patents.
Tuesday, May 24, 2005
Welcome to all!
Dear All,
I have just started a dedicated blog on pharmaceutical patents. I hope to post my first piece soon.
Feroz Ali
I have just started a dedicated blog on pharmaceutical patents. I hope to post my first piece soon.
Feroz Ali
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